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THE POSSIBILITY OF A CHRISTIAN 
PHILOSOPHY: A THOMISTIC PERSPECTIVE 
John F. Wippel 
In addressing myself to this issue, I have chosen to concentrate on what one 
might call a "Thomistic" perspective for at least two reasons: first in order to 
bring some historical background to bear on our topic; and secondly, because 
in my opinion today's believing Christian who would engage in philosophizing 
about certain questions of relevance to his religious belief may find something 
useful in Aquinas's approach. At the same time, I am only too aware that the 
proper interpretation of Aquinas's thinking on this matter has been subject to 
considerable debate during the twentieth century, and especially during the period 
running roughly from 1930 into the 1960's. In 1931 a memorable conflict about 
the possibility of Christian philosophy broke out between Emile Brehier and 
Etienne Gilson at a meeting of the Societe franraise de philosophie. This was 
followed by another lively session devoted to the same problem some two years 
later at a meeting of the French Thomist society, held at Juvisy. 1 While these 
debates were by no means limited to the proper interpretation of Aquinas's 
thinking on this matter, this would become a central part of much of the ensuing 
controversy concerning the possibility of a Christian philosophy. 2 
One reason for the disagreement concerning the proper interpretation of 
Aquinas's thought on this issue may be the fact that he did not address himself 
in so many words to the problem of Christian Philosophy. He did, however, 
have a great deal to say about the relationship between faith and reason. And 
in his own work as a professional theologian, he did develop a highly sophisticated 
philosophy. One can learn from Thomas not only by observing what he said 
about the faith-reason problem, but also by considering carefully what he did-the 
procedure he followed-in addressing himself to topics of philosophical interest. 3 
It will not be my intention here to rehearse the various elements of the twentieth-
century debate concerning Christian Philosophy. What I rather propose to do is 
to single out certain generally accepted principles and procedures which one 
finds in many Christian thinkers long before Aquinas. Then I would like to 
highlight some additional precisions contributed by Thomas himself to the general 
issue of the faith-reason problem. Finally, I would like to offer some reflections 
about the possible application of some of Thomas's precisions to the twentieth-
century situation for the Christian philosopher. 
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Long before the time of Aquinas we find a fairly clear awareness on the part of 
many leading Christian thinkers of the difference between believing in something 
because it has been revealed by God, on the one hand, and accepting it as true be-
cause it has been demonstrated, on the other. One can offer illustrations of this 
from some of the Fathers of the Church. For that matter, a number of Christian 
thinkers also saw this same distinction implied by Paul's statement in Romans 
1 :20: "For since the creation of the world his invisible attributes are clearly seen-
his everlasting power and divinity-being understood through the things that are 
made." Without pausing here to discuss whether this is or is not the correct in-
terpretation of this oft -quoted Scriptural passage, it will be enough for me to stress 
the fact that it was frequently enough cited-and cited to make the point that cer-
tain fundamental truths can be discovered about God without one's relying on re-
velation and that these were accessible to the pagans. 4 
At the same time, we have an interesting case in Justin the Martyr. He tells of his 
having investigated the various leading philosophies of his day, and of his ability 
to find satisfaction only in Christianity. For this, as he puts it, is the only sure and 
useful philosophy. Here the term "philosophy" is being used in a broad sense, so as 
to be equivalent to a distinctive world-view, in this case, Christianity. But Justin 
also refers to the writings of the prophets, who "gave no proof at that time for their 
statements. For, as reliable witnesses of the truth, they were beyond proof." Im-
plied in that remark seems to be our distinction between believing something and 
accepting it because it has been proved. S 
Or if we tum to St. Augustine, he distinguishes clearly between believing some-
thing on religious grounds and proving it philosophically, for instance, in Bk. II of 
his De libero arbitrio. But in that very same context he quotes Isaias 7:9 from the 
Latin translation of the Septuagint to this effect: "Unless you believe, you shall not 
understand." The fact that the Septuagint and hence its Latin translation as known 
to Augustine was a mistranslation does not alter the historical importance this ad-
monition was to have on subsequent Latin medieval thought. First believe, and 
then seek to understand, we are repeatedly reminded by an Anselm and others who 
follow in his wake. 6 
Against this, one might offer Boethius as a counterexample. In him we have a 
far sharper separation between that which he accepts on religious faith, and that 
which he analyzes philosophically. This is reflected by the fact that he did write 
purely philosophical works-translations and commentaries in large measure, to 
be sure---and that he also wrote what we know today as his "theological treatises." 
In most of the latter, however, there is an interesting application of philosophical 
reasoning to topics which follow from and presuppose the Christian faith. His 
Consolation of Philosophy stands apart. There we have a philosophical discussion 
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of some of the great problems both for theistic philosophers and for religious be-
lievers-the seeming triumph of evil rather than of virtue in this life, and the recon-
ciliation of all of this and of free human activity with an omniscient and provident 
God. So sparing is Boethius of references to his Christian faith in the Consolation 
(there is no explicit mention of it) that for a time some scholars doubted that this 
work could have been written by a believing Christian, that is, by the author of the 
theological treatises. Yet it clearly was. 7 
I have recalled the above points in order to show that long before the time of 
Aquinas Christian thinkers were already well aware of the need to make some dis-
tinction between that which they believed and that which they claimed to establish 
by natural reason. At the same time, it must also be admitted that relatively few of 
these Christian writers were interested in working out a pure philosophy for its own 
sake, or in protecting the autonomy of any such philosophy. Most of them were 
much more interested in developing what, for want of a better expression, we 
might call "Christian wisdom." Many of them would employ and even develop a 
great deal of philosophical reasoning in pursuing Christian wisdom, as they under-
stood it, and some wrote what we might, even by post-medieval standards, refer to 
as philosophical works. 8 But in the main, as I have indicated, they were much more 
interested in using and developing philosophy only insofar as it could be of service 
to their pursuit of Christian wisdom. To what extent, then, if at all, were these writ-
ers engaged in what we might call "Christian philosophy?" 
It has been suggested, for instance by F. Van Steenberghen, that we might take 
the term "philosophy" very broadly, so as to signify a general Weltanschauung or 
world-view. In this sense we can refer to the achievements of such thinkers not 
only as illustrations of Christian wisdom, it would seem, but also as illustrations of 
Christian Philosophy. The only problem with this is that the word philosophy is 
being used very broadly, so as to be equivalent to wisdom, and this application as 
Christian Philosophy seems to cover both the philosophical and theological dimen-
sions of the achievement of such Christian writers. But suppose we take the term 
"philosophy" much more strictly, so as to apply only to an enterprise worked out 
on purely rational grounds and under the positive guidance of natural reason alone. 
Then, while it remains true that we can refer to such early Christian thinkers as 
Christian philosophers, it seems to be more difficult to justify describing their 
work as Christian Philosophy. 9 
II 
With this, I would now like to tum to Thomas Aquinas. Like his predecessors 
and his contemporaries, Thomas clearly distinguished between believing some-
thing on religious grounds--{)n the authority of God revealing-and knowing 
something because of natural or philosophical evidence or demonstration. Corres-
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ponding to this, he also distinguishes two kinds of truths about divine things which 
are accessible to us. 
On the one hand, there are certain truths concerning God and divine things 
which natural reason can discover, truths such as God's existence, or God's unity, 
and others of this kind. Thomas acknowledges that the philosophers have in fact 
demonstrated some of these things concerning God (SCG 1,3). But there is another 
kind of truth concerning divine things which completely surpasses human under-
standing. Here Thomas has in mind what we might refer to as revealed mysteries, 
such as the Trinity or the Incarnation. These could never be discovered by unaided 
natural or philosophical means. Given this distinction, Thomas also argues that it 
was fitting for God to reveal some of those truths about himself which, at least in 
principle, unaided human reason could discover. For otherwise, reasons Thomas, 
very few men would succeed in discovering truths such as God's existence. Even 
those who did succeed in this effort would do so only after a long period of time had 
passed, and quite likely with a considerable degree of error intermingled with the 
truth they had discovered (SCG 1,4). 
Thomas goes on within this same general context in Bk. I ofthe Summa contra 
gentiles to argue that there can be no real contradiction between the truth which 
natural reason or philosophy can discover and that truth which has been revealed to 
man by God. Thomas spells out his reasons for making this claim even more 
clearly in his Commentary on the De Trinitate of Boethius. There Thomas is con-
sidering the question whether in the science of the faith which treats of God (in 
other words, whether in one's theology) it is permissible for one to use philosophi-
cal arguments and authorities. 10 
He begins his reply by stressing one of his central theological points: the gifts of 
grace are not added to nature so as to destroy nature but rather so as to perfect it. If 
this is so, the light of faith which is given to us as a grace does not destroy the light 
of natural reason. Thomas immediately adds that this light of natural reason is also 
given to us by God. Granting that the natural light of the human mind is insufficient 
to manifest those things which can be discovered only by faith-that is, the re-
vealed mysteries-it is impossible, continues Thomas, for those things which are 
given to us by God through faith to be contrary to those which are instilled in us by 
nature. For one or the other would have to be false. (Here the unexpressed premise 
is that two contradictory propositions cannot both be true at the same time.) And 
since both of these come to us from God, to admit this would be to make God him-
self the author of falsity. This, of course, Thomas rejects as impossible. 11 
Thomas then applies this same reasoning to the relationship between faith and 
philosophy. (Until this point in our text he had compared faith and reason.) Just as 
what he here calls sacred teaching (sacra doctrina)-which is roughly equivalent 
to theology-is based on the light of faith, so is philosophy based on the natural 
light of reason. Therefore, continues Thomas, it is impossible for those things 
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which belong to philosophy to be opposed to those which are given to us through 
faith. He also comments that the things known to us by philosophical means will 
fall short of those which we accept on faith. Again the implied presuppositions are 
twofold. First, both religious faith and philosophically discovered truth are given 
to us by God, one by him as the author of revelation, and the other by him as the 
creator. Secondly, two contradictory propositions cannot both be true at the same 
time. Hence we have Thomas's serene conclusion that there can be no real conflict 
between faith and reason, and therefore none between faith and philosophy. While 
in this discussion Thomas is writing as a theologian and is seeking to justify the ap-
propriateness of employing philosophical argumentation in theologizing, he 
clearly recognizes the distinctiveness of the philosophical approach and its legiti-
macy. [2 
Still, Thomas is aware that in times past philosophers have arrived at conclu-
sions which are at odds with the faith. And he himself would actively intervene in 
another such controversy some years later during his second Parisian teaching 
period (1269-1272) when confronted with certain heterodox views being advanced 
in the Arts Faculty there. What then, of such situations where there is contradiction 
between philosophers and religious belief? Thomas comments that if anything is 
found in the sayings of the philosophers which is contrary to religious belief, this is 
not philosophy but rather an abuse or misuse of philosophy resulting from the 
weakness of human reason. Here again his overriding conviction is the same. 
There can be no real conflict between faith and reason. Hence, in cases of conflict 
between an alleged philosophical conclusion and something that is really con-
tained in revelation, Aquinas concludes that the philosopher must have made some 
mistake in arriving at this conclusion. In other words, Thomas allows for one's re-
ligious beliefto correct one's philosophizing in cases of conflict between the two. 13 
In fact Thomas concludes from this that in such a situation it is possible by using 
the principles of philosophy to refute an error of this kind either by showing that it 
is impossible, or else by showing that it has not been demonstrated. Here he is al-
lowing for two types of situations. It might be that the revealed truth which has 
been contradicted by a particular philosopher is the kind which is also capable of 
being demonstrated philosophically-a truth such as God's existence, for in-
stance. In that case it should be possible for the believer, by using purely 
philosophical means, to demonstrate the falsity of the alleged philosophical posi-
tion and, in effect, thereby demonstrate the truth of its contradictory, that is of the 
revealed datum. On the other hand, it may be that the kind of revealed truth which 
has been contradicted by a philosopher is a pure mystery, and hence not open to 
philosophical demonstration-a truth such as the Trinity, for instance. In this case 
Thomas does not hold that one can demonstrate the falsity of the denial of that 
truth; for then one would in effect be demonstrating the truth of the revealed mys-
tery itself. But one can, he is convinced, show that the alleged philosophical con-
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clusion has not in fact been demonstrated. 14 
Thomas concludes this discussion by singling out three ways in which one may 
use philosophy in sacra doctrina: (1) in order to demonstrate certain things which 
he here describes as preambles to faith, such as God's existence, or the unity of 
God, and other things of this kind which, he says, are proved in philosophy and 
presupposed by faith; (2) in order to make manifest certain things which are proper 
to faith by using similitudes (analogies) drawn from the philosophical order for the 
purpose of illustration; (3) in order to reply to attacks against the faith either by 
showing that such attacks are false in their claims, or at least by showing that their 
claims have not themselves been demonstrated. IS 
Thomas also comments that those who use philosophy in their theologizing can 
fall into error in one of two ways: either by introducing things which are opposed to 
the faith and which are not, in Thomas's judgment, true philosophy but rather a 
corruption or an abuse of philosophy; or by attempting to include within 
philosophy things which are reserved for faith (for instance, by refusing to accept 
on faith anything which cannot be proven philosophically). 16 
Thomas's immediate purpose in this discussion from his Commentary on the De 
Trinitate was to justify and then to clarify the theologian's usage of philosophical 
reasoning in his theologizing. But here we are interested in the question of Chris-
tian Philosophy. What do Thomas's remarks tell us about his views concerning the 
believer's use and practice of philosophy, even if that believer does not happen to 
be a theologian? Such a situation was not unknown to Aquinas, for there were 
Masters in the Arts Faculty at Paris who were Christians and who claimed to be 
philosophers. They were certainly not theologians. Names such as Siger of Brab-
ant and Boethius of Dacia come to mind. What of them? And what of the Christian 
today who would be a philosopher, and who is perhaps neither professionally 
trained as nor interested in becoming a theologian? 
Certain points from Thomas's discussion of the faith-reason relationship should 
be recalled here. First of all, he does clearly distinguish between faith and reason, 
and then just as clearly between both faith (and theology), on the one hand, and 
philosophy, on the other. If the motive for accepting something as true in the case 
of religious belief is divine authority, in the case of philosophy it can only be natur-
ally accessible evidence. Secondly, in the course of defending the theologian's 
right to use philosophy in his theologizing, Thomas has also defended the legiti-
macy of philosophy. Not only is it distinct from faith and from theology; it can ar-
rive at truth, and even at some truths concerning divine things. Finally, Thomas 
has allowed faith to playa negative role in the believer's assessment of any 
philosophical conclusion which conflicts with revealed data. In such cases, be-
cause of his conviction that two contradictory propositions cannot both be true at 
the same time and because of God's authorship of revealed truth, Thomas holds 
that there must be something wrong with one's philosophizing. 
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But some twentieth-century defenders of the Christian character of Thomas's 
philosophy insist that this is not enough. It is not enough for the believing Christian 
to allow his religious belief to serve as a negative norm in his philosophizing. As 
they note, Thomas himself was by profession a theologian rather than a pure 
philosopher. In the course of developing his theology he also worked out a highly 
interesting and original philosophy. But, we are reminded, and especially by 
Etienne Gilson and his followers, Thomas philosophized only as a believing Chris-
tian and as a professional theologian. Hence one must allow for some kind of posi-
tive and intrinsic influence which runs from Thomas's faith to his philosophy. Any 
effort on our part to separate his philosophy from its original theological context is 
bound to be inaccurate, historically speaking, and to run counter to his spirit. In 
short, Thomas Aquinas was not a pure philosopher, but a philosophizing theolo-
gian or, as Gilson often expressed it, a Christian philosopher. And if this is so, one 
cannot describe his philosophical achievement as pure philosophy but as "Christ-
ian Philosophy."'7 
Not only this, but if a believing Christian today would be guided by Aquinas's 
procedure in his own philosophizing, he should do no less. He should not attempt 
to develop a philosophy independently from his religious belief or, according to 
the later Gilson, independently from his theology. In fact, if one wishes to become 
a philosopher in the Thomistic sense, or to become a Christian philosopher as Gil-
son understands this, it seems that according to the later Gilson, one should first 
become a theologian and philosophize from within one's theology. 18 
Since on other occasions I have critically examined the historical accuracy of 
some aspects of Gilson's presentation of Aquinas's philosophy as a Christian 
Philosophy, I shall quickly pass over that issue here. 19 On the historical side, it will 
be enough for me to recall some of Thomas's views concerning the intrinsic integ-
rity, the methodology, and the order which are proper to philosophy, and espe-
cially to metaphysics. 
Aquinas has worked out in detail his views concerning the distinction between 
theology and philosophy, and within philosophy itself, between its different parts. 
He distinguishes practical philosophy from speculative or theoretical philosophy, 
both by reason of the different kinds of things studied in each, and by reason of di-
versity in end or goal. Within theoretical philosophy he distinguishes between nat-
ural philosophy, mathematics, and metaphysics, and this in tum by reason of the 
different kinds of subjects for theoretical inquiry (speculabilia); the different kinds 
of intellectual processes required to discover these subjects; and the different 
levels of termination or verification for the propositions which are characteristic of 
each, that is, of natural philosophy, mathematics, and metaphysics. 20 More than 
this, he also clearly distinguishes between the theological order (wherein one 
moves from a study of God to a study of creatures) and the philosophical order 
(wherein one moves from a study of created being to a study of God, its cause). 21 
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Throughout his literary corpus, both in his philosophical and in his theological 
writings, various elements of his philosophy, and especially of his metaphysics, 
are to be found. 
It is true that Thomas never presented a Summa philosophiae or a Summa 
metaphysicae which would more less be his philosophical parallel to his Summa 
theologiae or his Summa contra gentiles. It is also clear that he had created a gen-
eral philosophical and in particular a metaphysical synthesis in his own mind, and 
that he constantly drew upon this in addressing himself to particular philosophical 
and theological issues. From the historical standpoint, therefore, today's historian 
of philosophy has every right to try and recapture the essential elements of 
Thomas's philosophical and metaphysical thought. In doing this he should use all 
of Thomas's writings in which the various elements of that philosophical thought 
are to be found-both philosophical writings and theological writings. He should 
not ignore Thomas's Commentaries on Aristotle, or minimize the importance of 
his philosophical opuscula, as Gilson tended to do. Today's scholar should be 
guided in his efforts at historical reconstruction by Thomas's detailed indications 
concerning the proper subject-matter, distinctive type of thinking, and level of ver-
ification which are appropriate to metaphysics and to the other parts of theoretical 
philosophy. And he should present the elements of this thought according to the 
philosophical order as this is defined by Aquinas, not according to the theological 
order followed by Thomas in his works of theological synthesis, as Gilson would 
have today's scholar do. 22 
I stress these historical points because they show that Thomas had worked out 
the distinction between philosophy, on the one hand, and faith as well as theology, 
on the other, with greater thoroughness and precision than any other Christian 
thinker before his time. They also indicate how concerned he was with defining 
precisely the distinctive subject-matters and methodologies of the various parts of 
philosophy, especially of theoretical philosophy. 
III 
Rather than delay longer over the accuracy of Gilson's historical reading of 
Aquinas I shall now tum to the more theoretical question: If one would 
philosophize today while remaining a believing Christian, and if one would do so 
in accord with Aquinas's views concerning the proper relationship between faith 
and reason and between theology and philosophy, should one move from one's 
faith to the development of one's philosophy? Or to put this even more forcefully, 
should one first become a theologian and move from one's theology to one's 
philosophy? And if one does proceed in either of these ways, can the resulting en-
terprise fittingly be described as Christian Philosophy? Gilson has, at least in his 
later writings, replied in the affirmative to each of these questions. 21 On the other 
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side, if one rejects any such approach (as I would at least in part) and still wishes to 
philosophize while continuing to be a Christian, is there any proper sense in which 
one's undertaking may be described as Christian Philosophy? 
For my part, I would prefer to fall back upon a distinction between the order or 
moment of discovery, on the one hand, and the order or moment of proof, on the 
other. Some other scholars have already suggested that this distinction can be 
applied to the present issue. Often enough those who reject the possibility of a 
Christian philosophy do so because they view philosophy only in its moment of 
proof-as a completed set of propositions including principles, proofs, and con-
clusions. Here, it seems to me, they conclude correctly that nothing borrowed 
from religious belief or theology can enter in. To admit the contributions of faith 
into the process of proof would be to destroy the philosophical character of the un-
dertaking and to tum it into theology or at the least, into an extension of religious 
belief.24 
One may also consider philosophy, or a particular philosophical position, in 
terms of its development, that is, in terms of the process or inquiry whereby it is 
discovered. In the positive sciences it is possible for one to work backward from a 
given hypothesis and to search for evidence which might verify that hypothesis. So 
too, mutatis mutandis, in the course of developing a philosophical point it may be 
that, in the moment of discovery, a particular issue was first suggested to the 
philosopher by some nonphilosophical source. If so, there seems to be nothing to 
prevent the philosopher from then working backward, as it were, to search for 
philosophical evidence which might or might not lend support to the original prop-
osal. 25 
Thus for the Christian it may be that in certain instances some revealed datum 
serves as a leading question or working hypothesis for his philosophical inquiry. 
While as a believing Christian he will continue to assent to this datum or believe in 
it, he may now decide to investigate it as a possible object of rational or philosophi-
cal demonstration. If he succeeds in finding rational evidence which supports it, 
then and to that extent his procedure will be strictly philosophical in the moment of 
proof. In other words, in the moment of proof his procedure cannot be described as 
Christian philosophy. But since in the moment of discovery it was his religious be-
lief that first suggested this particular issue to him as a possible subject for 
philosophical investigation, one might refer to such a procedure as Christian 
Philosophy in the order of discovery. 26 
This would seem to be one way in which a particular philosophical inquiry might 
be described as Christian in its moment of discovery, without necessarily being de-
scribed as or changed into theology, I might add, even in that same moment of dis-
covery. In its moment of proof, however, it would be pure philosophy, not Chris-
tian Philosophy. And in this same rather qualified sense I would be willing to admit 
not only that there are Christian philosophers, but that there can be such a thing as 
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Christian Philosophy-that is, in the moment of discovery. 27 
This distinction seems to parallel more or less one offered some decades ago by 
Gilson himself, when he distinquished between philosophy considered concretely 
(or as it exists in the mind of the philosopher), and philosophy considered 
abstractly (or in terms of its essence). He then argued that philosophy is not Chris-
tian when it is viewed simply in terms of its essence, but that it is Christian when 
considered as it exists concretely in the Christian who philosophizes. 1 would ac-
cept this distinction, but in the way just indicated. Philosophy as it exists con-
cretely in the mind of the Christian who philosophizes may be described as Chris-
tian in its moment of discovery of certain points, though not in its moment of proof 
even of those points. In other words, this distinction would seem to justify our 
speaking not only of Christian philosophers, but also of Christian Philosophy in its 
moment of discovery. 28 
An additional question could be raised. If philosophy can be Christian in its mo-
ment of discovery, is it intrinsically Christian when it is so viewed? Or is this not 
merely like naming it Christian because the people who are practicing it happen to 
be Christian? There has been some disagreement with respect to this on the part of 
those who have applied the distinction between moment of discovery and moment 
of proof to the issue of Christian Philosophy. Here I will only speak tentatively. It 
seems to me that, as regards its moment of discovery, if a particular point was first 
suggested to a believing philosopher because of his religious faith, that same re-
ligious faith does enter into our philosopher's initial discovery of the point under 
examination, and in an intrinsic way. Hence I would suggest that if this way of 
philosophizing can be called Christian in its moment of discovery, it can also be re-
garded as intrinsically Christian, but once again only in its moment of discovery, 
not in its moment of proof. 29 This would seem to follow to the extent that one is 
willing to include the moment or process of discovery within one's understanding 
of philosophy. 
Moreover, it appears to me that on various occasions the procedure actually fol-
lowed by Aquinas and many of his medieval predecessors and contemporaries in 
developing particular philosophical points could be described as Christian 
Philosophy in this same way. For surely neither Thomas nor anyone who has been 
a believing Christian from birth first demonstrated truths such as God's existence 
or God's providence before believing in them. Rather, having been instructed in 
the faith and having professed belief in God and many like truths, our believer 
would only subsequently be introduced to philosophy in the formal sense. At that 
point a medieval believer or, for that matter, a contemporary believer, might well 
wonder what philosophy has to say about some of the things he has already be-
lieved, and he might regard some of them as working hypotheses or as possible 
subjects for philosophical inquiry. He would be influenced, therefore, in the order 
of discovery by his religious belief and would practice Christian Philosophy. If he 
282 John F. Wippel 
eventually succeeded in demonstrating any such conclusion philosophically, that 
demonstration would not be Christian Philosophy, but pure philosophy. 
To offer but two other illustrations, this description seems to me to capture quite 
well Augustine's usage of philosophy in Bk. II of his De libero arbitrio. There, 
after recalling explicitly that he believes that God exists, Augustine proposes to de-
monstrate this by rational argumentation or, if you will, philosophically. Indeed, 
within that context this is his way of carrying out the admonition that one should 
first believe and then seek to understand. Again, this would be one way of inter-
preting Anselm's procedure in the Proslogion. After calling upon God for assist-
ance, Anselm now wishes to understand that which he believes-that God exists as 
Anselm believes, and that God is that which Anselm believes him to be. It is only 
then that he presents his well-known if much controverted "Anselmian" argument 
for God's existence. Moreover, one could view the entire Proslogion as one con-
tinuing illustration of this same procedure. 30 
It also seems to me that in works such as his The Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy 
Gilson has shown that a number of particular points first entered into human con-
sciousness as a result of belief in the Judeo-Christian revelation. To the extent that 
some of these points eventually served as objects for philosophical inquiry by 
Christian thinkers, they may be regarded as additional illustrations of what I would 
describe as Christian Philosophy in the order of discovery. 
One of the great strengths in Thomas's approach-at least in my opinion-is the 
clarity with which he himself distinguishes between faith and reason, and between 
faith and philosophy. To me it is important for today's interpreter of Aquinas, and 
for that matter, for today' s belie~ing Christian who would also be a philosopher, to 
preserve this distinction as clearly as possible. This does not necessarily mean, of 
course, that one will always sharply distinguish between purely philosophical 
writings and purely theological writings. Thomas himself often combines 
philosophizing and theologizing within the same work. But it does mean that one 
should be consciously aware of what one is doing when one reflects upon such is-
sues- that one should know when one is accepting something for religious 
reasons or on faith, and when one is attempting to establish a point philosophi-
cally. 
Granting all ofthis, however,"! must also acknowledge that the situation is often 
more complicated in practice than my previous remarks may have suggested. It is 
not always simply a question of distinguishing between the order of discovery and 
the order of proof. To illustrate, how are we to describe seemingly philosophical 
inquiries which rest upon and presuppose data supplied by and only by religious 
belief-for instance, an intricate philosophical discussion of the relationships be-
tween the divine persons within the Trinity, or a similar discussion of the distinc-
tion between nature and person as applied to the mystery of the Incarnation? Can 
such investigations be described as philosophical, properly speaking, or perhaps 
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as Christian philosophy, or perhaps only as straight theology? 
Even concerning such cases different possible situations may be envisioned. For 
example, it might be that the philosophical inquiry itself presupposes the truth of 
the religious beliefs which have been assumed, and that there is no conceivable 
way in which such a truth or truths can be demonstrated philosophically. In this 
event it would seem that such investigations go beyond the realm of the purely 
philosophical, and even beyond the realm of Christian Philosophy in the order of 
discovery. In other words, in such cases it seems to me that one is in fact practicing 
speculative theology, not pure philosophy, and not Christian Philosophy. Here, to 
use a metaphor taken from Aquinas himself, the water of philosophy will have 
been transformed into the wine of theology. 31 
Another possible situation comes to mind. Suppose that one's philosophical in-
vestigation is directed to articles of religious belief, and articles of faith in the strict 
sense-that is, those which cannot be demonstrated philosophically-but in such 
fashion that the philosophical inquiry does not rest upon or presuppose in any way 
that the articles of faith are true. Could such an inquiry be described as philosophy? 
And if so, could it be called Christian Philosophy? For example, suppose that one 
were simply interested in determining whether one article of faith was logically 
compatible with another, without necessarily committing oneself to accepting the 
truth of either as a presupposition for one's investigation, and without having any 
hope or intention of demonstrating the truth of either. It would seem that this kind 
of inquiry could be undertaken by the nonbeliever as well as by the believer. In 
what sense, if at all, should such an enterprise be called Christian Philosophy? 
Since no revealed premise is necessarily accepted as true, it would seem that 
such an enterprise would not presuppose either faith or theology, at least in any in-
trinsic way. Hence it seems that it should not be described as theology but as 
philosophy in some sense. Still, since the subject-matter under investigation is, ac-
cording to our hypothesis, distinctively Christian, would this be enough for us to 
describe this particular kind of philosophizing as another instance of Christian 
Philosophy? 
I would think not. One should not immediately conclude that because a particu-
lar philosophical inquiry is about an article or articles of Christian belief, the 
philosophical inquiry itself is Christian. To make such an inference would be 
somewhat like moving immediately from the objective genitive (a philosophy of 
Christianity in that it is about Christian beliefs) to the SUbjective genitive (a 
philosophy of Christianity in the sense that it is exercised by some one who is 
Christian, and in a distinctively Christian way). This would be no more justified 
than for us to conclude that because a philosophy of literature or history is about lit-
erature or about history it is necessarily and intrinsically literary or historical in it-
self. 
Finally, while I have defended at least one qualified way in which philosophy 
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might be described as Christian in its pursuit of particular points-in its moment of 
discovery, and while I have rejected some other ways in which philosophy itself 
might be called Christian, I do not wish to leave the impression that I have 
examined all possibilities. I definitely have not, and by limiting myself in large 
measure to an approach inspired by the principles of Aquinas, have tried to free 
myself from any obligation to consider all possible alternative candidates for the 
title Christian Philosophy. This I shall leave to others. 32 
I would suggest that, as other possible candidates for the description Christian 
Philosophy are considered, certain precisions introduced by Aquinas may be help-
ful. Thus one may ask, does a proposed Christian Philosophy preserve with clarity 
the distinction between faith, on the one hand, and philosophy viewed as a rational 
enterprise, on the other? Secondly, does it hold out the possibility of maintaining 
with some clarity the distinction between theology and philosophy, and between 
the theological and philosophical components of a particular enterprise? If the an-
swer to each of these questions is affirmative, does the association of any putative 
Christian Philosophy with Christian religious belief point to something that enters 
into and even serves to define its way of philosophizing as distinctively Christian? 
If the answer to either of the first two questions is negative, then one may doubt 
that one is dealing with philosophy in any proper sense. If the answer to the last 
question is negative, then one may doubt that the enterprise under consideration 
deserves to be called Christian in any proper sense, granted that it may be de-
scri bed as philosophy. 
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ligieuses 32 (1958), p. 168. On the need for an intrinsic relationship between revelation and reason for 
a philosophy to be Christian see The Spirit ... , pp. 35-37. While granting with J. Maritain that this in-
volves both objective aids and subjective reinforcements, Gilson has concentrated on the former be-
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their lives to the study of metaphysics (p. 286). In order to save Thomas from inconsistency in terms of 
his personal career, Gilson suggests that Thomas did not recommend against having young people 
study revealed theology, including whatever metaphysics and ethics it might contain (see pp. 289ff.). 
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inality of medieval philosophies is largely due to their being included in and developed within theolog-
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